Persuasion: A Case Study of Papal Influences on Fertility-Related Beliefs and Behavior, with Imran Rasul (UCL), American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, (2017) 9(4): 250–302 [Covered in AEA Research Highlights]
A Note on Charitable Giving by Corporates and Aristocrats: Evidence from a Field Experiment, with Steffen Huck (WZB and UCL) and Imran Rasul (UCL), Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, (2017) 66: 104-111
Explaining Attitudes Towards Demographic Behaviour, with Arnstein Aassve (Bocconi) and Maria Sironi (UPenn), European Sociological Review, (2013) 29 (2): 316-333
Tackling Youth Unemployment: Evidence from a Labor Market Experiment in Uganda, with Livia Alfonsi (BRAC), Oriana Bandiera (LSE), Robin Burgess (LSE), Imran Rasul (UCL), Munshi Sulaiman (BRAC and StC) and Anna Vitali (UCL), November 2017 [NEW!] [Covered in World Bank Blog]
We design a labor market experiment to compare demand-side and supply-side policies to tackle youth unemployment, a key issue in low-income countries. The two-sided experiment tracks 1700 workers and 1500 firms over four years to contrast the effects of offering workers vocational training (VT), to offering firms wage subsidies to train workers on-the-job (FT). Both treatments lead to skill accumulation but whilst VT workers learn sector-specific skills, FT workers learn more firm-specific skills. This is associated with higher employment rates for each type of treated worker but the effect is 50% larger for VT (21% vs 14%) and their total earnings increase by more (34% vs 20%). Structural estimates of a job ladder model reveal the mechanisms for this: VT workers receive higher rates of unemployment-to-job offers and higher rates of job-to-job offers. This greater labor market mobility stems from the certifiability and transferability of their skills, and causes the wage profiles of VT workers to diverge away from FT workers. Evidence from the firm-side of the experiment complements these findings. Relative to control firms, those that hire workers under wage subsidies are less productive to begin with, their long run profits rise by 11% as a result of these hires, but their overall firm size is unchanged. Our evidence shows both firms and workers are constrained in this setting and that subsidies to either side of the labor market would increase workers' employment and earnings. However, VT workers are better off than FT workers as the greater certifiability and transferability of their skills allows them to increase their labor market attachment and climb the job ladder more quickly.
Information Frictions in the Labor Market: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Uganda, with Aisha Nansamba (BRAC), April 2017 [Job Market Paper] [Under revision - New version coming soon!]
The Impact of Easing Firm Constraints on Small and Medium Enterprise Growth: Evidence from Uganda, with Oriana Bandiera (LSE), Robin Burgess (LSE), Imran Rasul (UCL), Munshi Sulaiman (BRAC and StC) and Anna Vitali (UCL)